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Abstract 
 
In this paper I argue that the thesis of nomological irreducibility that Davidson aims to 
establish in Mental Events cannot be understood without taking into consideration the central 
role that the constitutive ideal of rationality plays in his thinking about the nature of the 
mental. My aim is to investigate in more detail the conception of rationality that Davidson 
thinks plays an essential role in psychological theorizing. I suggest that the regulatory role of 
the feature of rationality, that is an essential one of the mental, bestows on mental concepts 
and the explanations in which they feature, an essential normative character. Such 
normativity depends on the fact that the concepts are necessarily ceteris paribus in the sense 
that the conditions that limit the application of the concepts aren’t exhaustively enumerable in 
any vocabulary. This undermines the possibility of formulating strict laws. Strict laws require 
that we are able to fully explicate the conditions that limit the application of the concepts it 
employs. Such exhaustive enumeration is possible only in the vocabulary of a closed theory, 
namely, physics. As soon as we change the vocabulary from mental to physical in order to 
fully explicate the clauses we can no longer recognize the events we describe to be mental 
ones. This change of subject is the result of the fact that we can no longer recognize the 
concepts to answer to a standard that is an ideal, namely, rationality. 
 
